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LIABILITY IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: A CIVIL CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR THE MOTHERS OF SREBRENICA AGAINST
THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, while under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), peacekeepers who were under the command and control of the
Dutch military, the citizens of Srebrenica, Bosnia, became victims of gruesome
atrocities and the worst genocide in Europe since World War II. 1 This
Comment does not ask the killings question. The Serbs are held liable for that
crime.2 Instead, this Comment seeks to identify the crimes committed by the
United Nations and the Netherlands by failing to prevent genocide in a town
they pledged to protect; and to suggest a successful path to monetary recovery
for the victims of Srebrenica.
As history tells us, the personal injury that the victims of genocide suffer is
not one that can simply heal with time. 3 While many non-governmental
organizations that seek justice on behalf of the victims of the Srebrenica
genocide exist, The Mothers of Srebrenica (The Mothers) is perhaps the most
well known organization.4 The Mothers represent approximately 6000 women
seeking justice—criminal and civil—for the genocide committed against their
loved ones. While the criminal prosecutions of those who committed the
genocide provided some justice for The Mothers of Srebrenica, they continue
to suffer from depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and loss of
companionship. The Mothers, like others in similar situations, ought to have
legitimate causes of action available to them within the Dutch court system
under various legal doctrines.5 The most supportive precedent for The Mothers
1 See Prosecutor v. Kristić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 28, 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Bosnian Genocide, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014); History of Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUROPE-CITIES, http://www.europe-cities.com/en/
654/bosnia-herzegovina/history/period1/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
2 Antoine Ollivier, Judicial and Similar Proceedings the Judgment of the International Court of Justice
in the “Genocide” Case Between Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 46 I.L.M. 185 (2007).
3 History of Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUROPE-CITIES, http://www.europe-cities.com/en/654/bosniaherzegovina/history/period1/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
4 See generally Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Questioning the UN’s Immunity in the Dutch Courts:
Unresolved Issues in the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 727 (2011).
5 See infra Part II.
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lawsuit is the Dutch Supreme Court’s 2013 groundbreaking decision in
Netherlands v. Nuhanović. This decision is the first time that any court has
held the Netherlands liable for the deaths in Srebrenica.
This Comment will proceed in a series of steps that begins with Part I and a
discussion of the situation that led to the atrocities: the disintegration of
Yugoslavia into multiple states, the Balkan conflict, U.N. involvement in the
region, and the genocide. Part II examines whether there is a sufficient
international legal doctrine that could respond to The Mothers’ injuries, and if
not, whether domestic legal doctrines and courts, like those in the Netherlands,
should be available for redress. Causes of action in this context might be based
in fraud, gross negligence, breach of duty, deprivation of self-defense and the
like.
This Comment argues that international law, lacking the basic tort elements
of adequate rules, rights, and remedies, is not the proper legal avenue to
address the Srebrenica atrocities. Instead, domestic law and courts, must fill
this void. If they do, however, additional important implications must be faced,
which will be discussed in the final portion of this Comment: Will the fact that
the United Nations and the Netherlands might find itself being sued for grossly
negligent peace-keeping efforts encourage more effective planning and
execution of the peace-keepings’ responsibilities? Or will that threat mean that
the United Nations will draw back from this vital international function? The
example of Srebrenica will be a case study for similar possible legal claims in
the future, like, for example, those that may arise if there is international
involvement in the present conflict in Syria.
I. BACKGROUND HISTORY ON YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA
The genocide that occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Bosnia) will be the case study for this paper and many of the above analysis
will be applied to it. Before the above analysis is applied to Srebrenica, it is
important to understand the history of Bosnia and the break-up of Yugoslavia
in order to comprehend the events that lead to Europe’s worst genocide since
World War II.6

6

See generally EUROPE-CITIES, supra note 3.
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A. The Origins of the Conflict
For centuries, the small country of Bosnia, located on the Balkan Peninsula
in Southern Europe,7 was Europe’s well-known multiethnic political entity that
was kept united under Josip Broz Tito’s (Tito) iron-hand regime.8 This multiethnicity dates back to the Ottoman Empire, which ruled parts of the Balkan
region between 1463 and 1878, resulting in many of the local, native Slavs’
converting to Islam.9 This conversion added the third major ethic group, the
Bosniaks,10 to Bosnia’s already existing Croat11 and Serb12 population.13 As is
to be expected in such a small, yet diverse region, many conflicts quickly
emerged as Western Europe encouraged the preservation of Christianity in the
region threatened by the newly emerging Islam population.14
Even though many conflicts existed throughout history between the
different ethnicities in Bosnia, Tito maintained peace among the different
groups and republics. 15 In fact, Tito’s former Yugoslavia model for this
multiethnic society is the only model that was able to provide peace and
stability in the region.16 However, Tito’s regime did not go without criticism,
and many who opposed this socialist system were pursuing a transition into the
federalism system.17 Nevertheless, even under Tito’s unifying regime, in 1946
the Yugoslavia Constitution divided the country into six republics: Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and two
autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo.18
Tito’s death in 1980 brought much political instability and economic
difficulties to Yugoslavia, and by the late 1980s, most of the republics of
7

Id.
Id.
9 Id.
10 Bosniac, or Bosniaks, is the term used to refer to Bosnian Muslims. ENCYC. OF THE NATIONS, http://
www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
11 Croat is the term used to refer to Bosnian Catholics whose roots stem for the neighboring country of
Croatia. Id.
12 Serb is the term used to refer to the Bosnian Orthodox population whose roots stem from the
neighboring country of Serbia.
13 Id.
14 See CATHIE CARMICHAEL, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF TRADITION 22 (2002).
15 See EUROPE-CITIES, supra note 3.
16 Tito’s Yugoslavia, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yugohist2.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
17 See id.
18 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (1946).
8
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Yugoslavia were seeking autonomy and democracy. 19 This democratic
pretense instead gave rise to nationalism in all the republics, with each republic
wanting a country for only its ethnicity.20 In 1989 the nationalist, Slobodan
Milosević, was elected as President of Serbia, and was seeking to establish a
pure Serbian country—“Greater Serbia”—free of all other ethnicities.21 As a
result, in 1990 all of the remaining republics held their first free elections,
which all resulted in nationalist parties’ victories throughout the region.22 With
such a nationalistic tone in the region, many began to question the future of the
republic without an ethnic majority such as Bosnia.23
Bosnia, unlike the other republics, had no ethnic majority, and in 1991 the
population of Bosnia was comprised of 43.5% Bosniaks, 32.1% Serb, 17.4%
Croat, 5.5% Yugoslav and 2.4% Other.24 Bosnia held a referendum in February
1992, as a response to the nationalistic threat that it felt from Serbia, and
declared its independence the following month. 25 In order to achieve this
result, the Bosniaks and Croats combined their efforts in order to outvote the
Serbs who were against an independent Bosnia. 26 The Serbs boycotted the
results of the referendum, and instead proclaimed their own republic,
Republika Srpska.27 As the international community recognized the independence
of Bosnia, diplomatic tensions between Bosnia and Serbia severely increased,
triggering Serbia to withdraw the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from the
territory.28
Serbia, “the guiding force” of the JNA,29 was in union with the Serbs in
Bosnia, providing them with much military assistance for their common goal—
the creation of a “Serb-dominated westerns extension of Serbia.”30 However,
there was one obstacle in the creation of this pure Serbian state: the Croat and

19

EUROPE-CITIES, supra note 3.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally id.
24 Angela M. Banks, Moderating Politics in Post-Conflict States: An Examination of Bosnia And
Herzegovina, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 6 (2005).
25 Id. at 7–8.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 EUROPE-CITIES, supra note 3.
29 Carlos J. Williams, Yugoslavia to Withdraw Troops from Slovenia, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 1991), http://
articles.latimes.com/1991-07-19/news/mn-2529_1_federal-troops.
30 Banks, supra note 24, at 8.
20
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Bosniac population living in this territory. 31 As a result, the Serbs utilized
ethnic cleansing in an attempt to create their one, pure, and united Serbia.32
According to the United Nations Commission of Experts, the ethnical
cleansing that the Serbs administered included: “murder, torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assaults,
confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal,
displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks
or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of
property.”33 While these atrocities occurred across the entire region, the worst
violations occurred in Srebrenica.34
B. The Genocide in Srebrenica
As the Serbs attempted to annex a block of territory in eastern Bosnia, they
encountered the predominately small, Bosniac town of Srebrenica.35 Since the
primary goal was the creation of a pure-Serbia, the inhabitants of Srebrenica
needed to be eliminated. 36 The President of Republic Srpska, Radovan
Karadžić, instructed his military forces to, “create an unbearable situation of
total insecurity with no hope of further survival, or life, for the inhabitants of
Srebrenica.” 37 On July 6, 1995, operation code-named “Krivaja 95”
commenced, with the Serb forces moving in “from the south and burning
Bosniak homes along the way.”38 As a result of “chaos and terror, thousands of
[Srebenica’s inhabitants]”39 sought shelter and safety by fleeing to the nearby
town of Potočari, which stationed about 200 Dutch peacekeepers.40 On July 11,
as Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić walked the streets of Srebrenica,
he stated on a recorded film for a Serb journalist, “We give this town to the
31

Id.
See id.
33 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, 49th
Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
34 Ian Traynor, Srebrenica genocide: Worst massacre in Europe since the Nazis, THE GUARDIAN (June
10, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/jun/10/hague-bosnian-serb-srebrenica-genocide1.
Because of the international community’s failure in Srebrenica, the press and media has discussed and
continues to cover the genocide in Srebrenica in the greatest detail. See id.
35 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).
36 See id.
37 R. Jeffrey Smith, Srebrenica Massacre, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (July 17, 2014), http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/1697253/Srebrenica-massacre.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
32
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Serb nation . . . The time has come to take revenge on the Muslims.”41 On this
same night, more than 10,000 Bosniaks attempted to escape from Srebrenica
by seeking an escape route through the dense forest. 42 Unfortunately, their
escape attempt was not successful, and the Serb troops either shelled them to
death or brought them back to the occupied territory.43
On July 13, 1995, Europe’s worst genocide since World War II was
committed.44 In the words of the presiding Judge of the Appeals chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
They [the Bosnian Serb forces] stripped all the male Muslim
prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal
belongings and identification and deliberately and methodically
killed them solely on the basis of their identity. By seeking to
eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces
committed genocide.45

Solely because of their ethnicity, the Serb forces executed over 8000 men and
young boys, scattering their remains all over the region in secret mass graves.46
C. United Nations’ Involvements in Bosnia and Its Mission
The international community, through the United Nations, quickly
acknowledged the gravity of the situation that resulted from the break-up of
former Yugoslavia. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
soon classified the conflict in Bosnia as an “international armed conflict, due to
the invasion by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and an internal armed
conflict.”47 At the beginning of the conflict between the republics, the Security
Council of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 713 which required that “all
States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia,
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council

41

Id.
Id.
43 Id.
44 Vernon Bogdanor, Srebrenica: The Silence Over Britain’s Guilt Must Be Ended, THE GUARDIAN
(July 12, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/12/srebrenica-massacrebosnia-and-herzegovina.
45 Traynor, supra note 34.
46 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland Application No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
6 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
47 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 16.
42
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decides otherwise.” 48 Unfortunately, this effort by U.N. would
“overwhelmingly benefit the Serbs”49 who were closely associated with JNA
and the arms industry, receiving much support in the form of military material,
intelligence, and funds from the Republic of Yugoslavia (today’s Serbia).50
The Croats received the “broad range of support” from the Republic of Croatia.
51

The primary purpose of the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) was to serve as a peacekeeping operation, although many U.N.
officials voiced their concern that such a mission would not be possible
without the cooperation between the hostile parties. 52 Originally
UNPROFOR’s mandate extended only to Croatia, and its mission was to
“ensure that the three ‘United Nations Protected Areas’ (UNPAs) in Croatia
were demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from
fear of armed attack.” 53 However, as the conflict in Bosnia intensified,
“UNPRFOR’s mandate and strength” were extended to the protection of the
Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. 54
Similarly, news quickly spread to the international community about the
desperate cry for help from Srebrenica and its surrounding towns. In
Srebrenica and its neighboring towns ethnic cleansing was already occurring,
and the Serbs were interfering with humanitarian aid, which created unbearable
conditions for the native populations. 55 In response, the Commander of the
UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia traveled to the region on March 11, 1993, to
observe the situation; and upon his arrival he witnessed first-hand the siege
conditions in Srebrenica.56 Prior to his departure from this “living hell,” the
Commander promised the native population at a public gathering in Srebrenica
that, “[the people of Srebrenica] were under United Nations’ protection and
that he [the Commander] would not abandon them.”57

48

Id. ¶ 12. Resolution 713 was adopted in 1991. Id.
Id.
50 Id. ¶ 15.
51 Id. ¶ 17.
52 Id. ¶ 13.
53 United Nations Protection Force, Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT
INFORMATION (Aug. 31, 1996), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm.
54 Id.
55 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 21.
56 Id. ¶ 38.
57 Id.
49

OF

PUBLIC
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While “no issue in the history of the Security Council has engendered more
resolutions and statements over a comparable period,” a consensus on the
extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate was unachievable.58 As a compromise,
the Security Council established “security zones,” “safe havens,” and
“protected areas” for the Bosniac population suffering at the hands of the
military equipped Serbs. 59 Immediately, additional concerns were raised,
primarily that such a mission would require “combat-capable” troops,
something that the peacekeepers on the ground were not.60
Once these “safe-havens” were established, UNPROFOR, without the
United Nations’ permission, took on the full responsibility of protecting these
areas.61 The UNPROFOR commanders convinced the Bosniac forces to sign
an agreement to “give up their arms to UNPROFOR in return for the promise
of a ceasefire [and] the insertion of an UNPROFOR company intro
Srebrenica.”62 As requested, the Bosniac troops handed over their weapons to
UNPROFOR, and approximately 170 UNPROFOR troops, principally from
Canada, established their presence for the first time in Srebrenica.63 Once the
Security Council was confronted with the situation on the ground, it supported
the efforts of UNPROFOR to demilitarize Srebrenica, stating, “the alternative
could have been a massacre of 250,000 people. It definitely was an
extraordinary emergency situation that had prompted UNPROFOR to act . . .
There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, which justifies the
efforts of the UNPROFOR Commander.” 64 Echoing this sentiment, the
Security Council in its May 8, 1993, agreement officially stated that Srebrenica
was to be considered a “demilitarized zone.”65
On June 4, 1993, in an effort to officially extend UNPROFOR’s mandate
into the “save haven”, the Security Council adopted Resolution 836 (1993)
under Chapter VII of the Charter and stated the following:
5.) . . . decides to extend . . . the mandate of the United Nations
Protection Force in order to enable it, in the safe areas . . . to deter
attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the
withdrawal of the military or paramilitary units other than those of
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 48.
Id.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id. ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶ 65.
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the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to
occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in
the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for
in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992;66
9.) Authorizes the Force, in addition to the mandate defined in
resolution 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 (1992) in carrying
out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defense,
to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to
bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to the
armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of
the Force or protected humanitarian convoys;67
10.) Decides that . . . Member States, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority
of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the
Secretary-General and the Force, all necessary measures through the
use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to support the Force in the performance of its mandate
set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 above.68

Relying on the protection of UNPROFOR, Srebrenica was induced into
demilitarizing its civilians and putting its faith into the hands of UNPROFOR’s
promise to protect them from the evil that was knocking on their doorstep.69
There was no consensus among United Nations’ member states on how
much protection UNPROFOR should offer, and how that authorized force
should be used.70 Even those member states with the most conservative view
on UNPROFOR’s authorization of force quickly acknowledged that more
troops were necessary to protect the area against the Serb forces that continued
to shell, bombard, and march towards Srebrenica, directly threatening Security
Council Resolution 836.71 While experts on the ground recommended that an
additional 135,000 troops be added to UNPROFOR in order for it to
successfully uphold its mandate, six months later, fewer than 2000 additional
soldiers were added.72 Of 2000 UNPROFOR soldiers, only 370 were stationed
in Srebrenica and expected to keep the peace in a town that the U.N. itself
66

Id. ¶ 78.
Id.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 See generally id.
70 Id. at 23–25.
71 See id. ¶ 94.
72 Lewis MacKenzie, The Real Story Behind Srebrenica, DAVID-MORRISON.ORG.UK, http://www.davidmorrison.org.uk/bosnia/srebrenica.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
67
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acknowledged was at great risk to a massacre.73 In retrospect, it is no surprise
that the Serbs continued with their “Greater Serbia” plan and marched on
Srebrenica on July 11, 1995.74 In his last attempt to save the “safe haven” the
Dutch commander transmitted a report to his superiors at the U.N. and
UNPROFOR leaders, in which he pleaded:75
I am responsible for these people [yet] I am not able to defend these
people; defend my own battalion; find suitable representatives among
the civilians because the official authorities are for certain reasons not
available; find representatives among the military authorities because
they are trying to fight for a corridor to the Tuzla area, and will not
show up anyway because of purely personal reasons; manage to force
ARBiH troops to hand-over their weapons . . . . In my opinion there
is one way out—negotiations today at the highest level; UNSG,
highest national authorities and both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian
Government.76

The commander’s cry for help was ignored due to structural problems within
the U.N. and UNPRFOR, and Srebrenica was seized that same day by the
Serbian forces. 77 Only two days later, under the “watchful eye” of
UNPROFOR did the Serbs execute 20,000 Bosniaks.78
D. Who Is Responsible?
While most of the world, except Republika Srpka and Serbia, does not
deny that genocide occurred in Srebrenica, many hold a different position on
who, other than the Serbs, is responsible and what remedies, if any, are
available.79 The majority of those who committed, or ordered their soldiers to
commit, genocide in Srebrenica have been, or are being, prosecuted on the
international platform at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

73

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 63.
See Leman Canturk, Anatomy of a Peacekeeping Mission: Srebrenica Revisited, WORLDPRESS.ORG
(Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/2975.cfm.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Marija Ristic, NGOs Criticize Serbian President for Genocide Denial, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ngos-criticize-serbian-president-forgenocide-denying; Bosnian Serbian Leader Denies Srebrenica Was Genocide, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (July 12, 2010), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serb-leader-denies-srebrenica-wasgenocide/.
74
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(ICTY)80 or in domestic courts.81 While the ICTY’s sentencing of these human
rights criminals has not gone without criticism,82 that is not the focus of this
Comment. The question, however, remains, who else was responsible? Many
of the victims’ relatives, as well as legal scholars believe that the Serb forces
would not have been able to commit genocide had UNPRFOR not disarmed
the people of Srebrenica.83 Consequently, they argue that the U.N. invoked a
duty to protect this vulnerable population once it disarmed them and failure to
do so, deprived the people of Srebrenica of their universal right to selfdefense.84 Thus, logically it follows that The Mothers of Srebrenica ought to be
able to seek a remedy for the suffering they endured as a result of the deadly
save havens.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDES LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE VICTIMS OF
GENOCIDE
The primary cause of action for The Mothers of Srebrenica is through
international tort law.85 To understand the analysis presented in this paper, it is
important to understand the basic principles of any successful legal system
which would give a plaintiff a cause of action and, if appropriate, a remedy for
any harm. Therefore, in order for The Mothers of Srebrenica to bring a
successful action against the Dutch government or the U.N., the legal system
must be comprised of the basic core elements—rules, rights, and remedies.86
A. The International Legal System and the Basis for Liability
One of the most well-known and basic concepts of legal jurisprudence is
that a legal system consists of rules.87 A number of scholars think of justice as

80

Key Figures of the Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGO., http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2014).
81 Denis Dzidic, Bosnia ‘Failing’ to Prosecute War Crimes Efficiently, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-war-crimes-prosecutions-dubbed-notefficient.
82 Jennifer J. Clark, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L. J. 1685, 1687 (2008).
83 See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland App. No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 13
(2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
84 Id.
85 See generally G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755
(2006).
86 See Legal Rights, in STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/.
87 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 8 (1961).
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either “justice according to law,” or justice “of the laws.”88 Many forms of
rules exist within any one system. Some are based on equity, others on
legislation, but the most common rules, which tend to be universally accepted,
stem from the concept of natural law.89 The idea of natural law traces back to
Aristotle, who argued that certain principles, such as the right to life, are
derived from nature and are binding upon all human society.90 Positivists91, on
the other hand, who deny the existence of natural law, argue that international
law which Bentham 92 spoke of, is not law because it lacks an enforcement
mechanism. 93 The key indicating words of rules within a legal system are
preceded by the words “must”, “should”, “ought to” (or their inverse)
indicating that the legal system is established by some kind of rules. 94
Nevertheless, regardless of their initial source, rules are one of the three core
requirements of any legal system.95
The second core requirement of any legal system is the existence of
rights.96 Well-known scholars such as Ronald Dworkin argue that if a system
does not have rights, it is in fact not a legal system.97 Thus, if a legal system
restricts an individual’s freedom or behavior through the concept of “rules,” it
ought to guarantee to the individual other freedoms through the concept known
as “rights.” The basic principle of the famous saying “what the left hand
giveth, the right hand taketh away” is clearly evident here. A legal system
would not be sustainable if it only imposed rules on its people, which restricted
their freedom, without in exchange, offering some rights.98 Even in countries
that are often criticized for not providing its people with enough rights, such as
88

See id. at 7.
See The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/natural-law-ethics/, for more on natural law.
90 Natural Law Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/natural%20law (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
91 Positivists define law as that what “derives from written decisions made by governmental bodies that
are endowed with the legal power to regulate particular areas of society and human conduct. Legal Positivism
Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Legal+Positivism (last visited
Oct. 5, 2014).
92 Jeremy Bentham is the earliest and chief expounder of utilitarianism. Brian Duignan, Jeremy Bentham,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/61103/Jeremy-Bentham (last updated Aug.
25, 2014).
93 See Legal Positivism, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legalpositivism/.
94 HART, supra note 87, at 10.
95 See id. at 6.
96 See id. at 7.
97 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
98 Id.
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Iran and China, the people still enjoy the basic right of not being murdered or
robbed by other citizens.99 Thus, the citizens have these rights because their
governments established rules that protect those rights.100
The last factor I mention is remedy. Blackstone considered remedy critical
to a legal system. 101 Remedy takes both corrective and punitive forms of
justice in civil law, as well as punishment in critical law.102 What good are
rules, if there are no enforcement mechanisms? What good are rights, if there
are no remedies for those whose rights have been violated? Most scholars, who
criticize international law, criticize it for lack of enforcement and remedy.103
While international law has provided justice through its international courts by
prosecuting those who committed genocide in Srebrenica, international law
ought to also enable The Mothers of Srebrenica, and other victims of gross
human rights violations, to seek their own justice in the courts.
While positivists such as H.L.A. Hart argue that international law is in fact
law, many other scholars do not agree with Hart’s conclusion, arguing that
because of the lack of enforcement, international law is not binding.104 There
are numerous reasons why the existence of international law is questioned,
ranging from lack of authority and legislature, to enforcement.105 However,
authority and enforcement in international law do in fact exist, and the most
common form of international law enforcement is through the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).106
B. International Organizations’ Liabilities
Originally, only States had standing under international law and were
subjected to the rules of international law. 107 Joseph Story was the first to
99 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1368 [1989],
art. 22; XIANFA art. 53 (1982) (China).
100 See id.
101 See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1321–22
(2003) (discussing Blackstone’s numbering remedy among the “five subordinate rights through which people
vindicated their absolute rights,” personal security, personal liberty, and private property).
102 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
55, 85–87, 95 (2003).
103 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law For States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1793 (2009).
104 See Hart, supra note 87; see also Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 1793.
105 See generally Goldsmith, supra note 101.
106 Research Guides, U.N., http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last updated Oct. 11, 2014).
107 See generally Robert Beckham & Dagmar Butte, Introduction to International Law, INT’L L.
STUDENTS ASS’N, http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/intlawintro.pdf.
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distinguish between public international law and private international law.108
While public international law regulates the matters affecting States, private
international law regulates international matters between individuals, such as
business transactions between companies.109 Today, the original view has been
expanded and allows individuals to be prosecuted under international law, and
in fact many prosecutions are conducted in international tribunals such as the
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 110
Therefore, if individuals are subject to the rules of international law by the
United Nations, they should also have the right to bring suits against the
United Nations, especially if they are victims of gruesome violations such as
genocide.111
Another fairly recent expansion of international law has included
subjecting organizations to its rules, rights, and remedies. The first case, which
recognized that organizations are subject to international law, is known as
“The Reparation Case.” 112 This case involved two United Nations General
Assembly appointed personnel, one a Swedish mediator and the other a French
observer, who were sent to Jerusalem after World War II in order to assist the
Israeli and Palestinian governments in reaching a peace agreement.113 Shortly
thereafter, persons wearing Israeli military uniform assassinated both UN
personnel in the Israeli zone.114 The relatives of the victims sued Israel in the
ICJ, since Israel was responsible for the actions of their soldiers.115 The United
Nations General Assembly saw this as a good opportunity to ask the ICJ for an
advisory opinion on whether an international organization could bring suit
against a government and obtain damages:
In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of
his duties suffers an injury in circumstances involving the
responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an Organization,
the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de
jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation
108

See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW

IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 48 (2003).
109 See id. at 43.
110

See Research Guides, supra note 104.
See generally id.
112 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Apr. 11, 1949).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations; and
(b) to the victim or to the persons entitled through him?116

In a groundbreaking decision, the ICJ advised that the General Assembly that
the United Nations does have the capacity to bring an international claim
against another government, and even against non-member states.117 The ICJ
based its decision on the U.N. Charter, by which the United Nations has its
own identity and personality, and is distinct from other member states. 118
Therefore, the United Nations was able to claim compensation from the Israeli
government for the deaths of its personnel and was successfully awarded
$100,000 for the loss of its Swedish mediator and French translator.119
In a legal context, it is always important to realize that the most
groundbreaking decisions can be a double-edged sword. When the ICJ
established the rule in the Reparation Case that international organizations
have the capacity to bring lawsuits, it implied that these organizations also
have certain obligations under international law.120 As a result, the ICJ once
more in its advisory opinion in the Immunity from Legal Process Case found
that “the United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the damage
arising from acts performed by the Organization or by its agents acting in their
official capacity.”121 While the court acknowledged the validity of the United
Nations’ immunity, which is granted to the organization under Article 105 of
its Charter, the court did not consider this immunity to be absolute and clearly
informed the world that the United Nations can also be sued for damages that
arise from it or its agents’ acts.122 This has been an important ruling, especially
in cases where United Nations’ troops are assigned to conflict areas. The
United Nations could be held liable for the actions of its troops, as long as the
United Nations “retains ultimate authority and control so that operational
command only was delegated.”123

116

Id.
Id.
118 See id.
119 Id.
120 See generally id.
121 Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29), 89.
122 Id.
123 Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 39
(2007), http:// http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80830.
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C. Attribution to the States
On several occasions, the ICJ has held that while acts of peacekeeping
missions can be attributed to the United Nations, they can also be attributed to
the States who contribute these troops. 124 According to Article I of the
European Convention on Human Rights, a country is responsible for the
conduct of the persons within its jurisdiction. 125 The United Kingdom
confirmed this responsibility with the House of Lords decision in Al-Jedda v.
Secretary of State for Defense in 2008.126 The claim before the House of Lords
was one of false imprisonment, where an Iraqi national claimed that his
detention violated the Human Rights Act of 1998 and the English common
law. 127 The House of Lords was charged with three issues on appeal: 128
whether the U.K. government or the United Nations was liable for the
appellant’s allegedly wrongful detention; 129 what obligations, 130 if any, does
the U.K. owe under the European Convention on Human Rights; 131 and
whether English common law or Iraqi law applied to the appellant’s
detention.132
On the first question, the House of Lords held that “the allegedly wrongful
conduct was attributable to the United Kingdom and not the United Nations,”
distinguishing this case from Behrami v. France because the U.K. forces were
not under the effective control of the United Nations. 133 On the second
question, the House of Lords found that the United Kingdom’s obligations
under the European Convention are limited to only those which it owes under
the U.N. Charter.134 And on the final question, the Lords of Appeal held that
Iraqi tort law would govern this case.135 In the interest of justice, the Dutch
Supreme Court ought to follow this English precedent and attribute the
124

See R v. Defence Secretary, [2008] 2 WLR 31 (H.L.) 35–37 (appeal taken from Eng.).
See id. at 46.
126 Id. at 68.
127 Id. at 34.
128 Id. at 34–35.
129 Id. The question of whether the United Nations was liable was raised because the acts could be
attributed “to the organization as a result of a Security Council Resolution that authorized multinational force
in Iraq.” Jacob Katz Cogan, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, INT’L LAW
REPORTER (Dec. 16, 2007, 12:13 AM), http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2007/12/r-on-application-of-al-jedda-v.
html.
130 R v. Defence Secretary, [2008] 2 WLR 31 (H.L.) 34 (appeal taken from Eng.).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Cogan, supra note 127.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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Dutchbat’s136 negligent conduct in Srebrenica to the Netherlands, if not to the
United Nations. Once the Court attributes UNPROFOR’s failure to the
Netherlands, The Mothers of Srebrenica would receive justice in the form of
monetary damages for UNPROFOR’s falsely induced promises of protection.
D. Causes of Action Available Under International Law for the People of
Srebrenica
The previous section of this Comment discussed the recent trend in
international law that holds the United Nations and its member states
responsible for a violation that they may commit on a mission. This Section
applies this concept to the Srebrenica genocide and argues that the United
Nations and the Netherlands need to be held responsible for the genocide
committed in Bosnia, regardless of their immunity. Applying the rules, rights,
and remedy analysis as previously discussed in Part II, the first question is to
ask what rule did the United Nations and the Netherlands violate in
Srebrenica? Those who have asked this question answer it with any, or all, of
the following three: fraud, gross negligence, and breach of duty. Each of these
legal avenues will be discussed and evaluated in this Section, in an attempt to
establish the best cause of action for The Mothers against the Netherlands and
the United Nations.
1. Fraud
Although fraud is a rule that has a long and varied history in most legal
societies, there are common standards that govern the definition of fraud under
international law. 137 Broadly defined, fraud is “a false representation of a
matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that
deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon
it to her or his legal injury.”138 Thus, fraud can be broken up into five elements:
“1) a false statement of material fact; 2) knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the statement is untrue; 3) intent on the part of the defendant to

136

Dutchbat is the United Nations’ short form for “Dutch Battalion.” Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and
Others v. Netherland Application No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 6 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
137 Fraud Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fraud (last
visited Sept. 27, 2014).
138 Id. This is the common law definition of fraud.
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deceive the alleged victim; 4) justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the
statement; and 5) injury to the alleged victim as a result of this reliance.”139
The possibly fraudulent activity of the United Nations and UNPROFOR is
the creation of the safe haven in Srebrenica and promising the residence of
Srebrenica its protection.140 The United Nations created the safe havens, while
the commander of UNPROFOR promised the people of Srebrenica that they
were “under United Nations protection,” and that “he would not abandon
them.”141 UNPROFOR and the United Nations quickly realized that the Serb
forces were not obeying the safe havens, but were continuing with their attacks
at the same rate as before.142 In fact, direct statements from the United Nations
indicated that a bloody massacre was possible, and yet the United Nations
disarmed the people of Srebrenica and stationed a peacekeeping mission on the
ground, one that was not equipped to keep or establish peace.143 The United
Nations and UNPROFOR intended for the people of Srebrenica to rely on their
promise protection; this was evident from the statements that were made to the
people before disarming them.144 It was certainly reasonable for the vulnerable
people of Srebrenica to rely on the statement and promises that were made to
them by the United Nations and UNPROFOR. The last element of fraud is the
most evident in this case: as a result of the people of Srebrenica’s reliance on
UNPROFOR’s statement and U.N. disarmament, they were handed over to the
enemy and were victims of genocide. 145 While The Mothers of Srebrenica
would have a great challenge proving the intent to defraud element of fraud, in
the interest of justice that challenge ought to be outweighed by the strong
establishment of the other four elements.
2. Gross Negligence
A second cause of the action for The Mothers of Srebrenica is gross
negligence, or dolo proxima.146 Once again, different legal systems will have
different standards and elements for gross negligence, but the common
definition of gross negligence is “carelessness in reckless disregard for the
139

Id.
See generally U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35.
141 Id. at 14.
142 Id. at 25.
143 See id. at 19.
144 See id. at 13–14.
145 See id.
146 Gross
Negligence, THEFREEDICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Gross+
negligence.
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safety or lives of others, which is so great it appears to be a conscious violation
of other people’s right to safety.”147 Gross negligence must not be confused
with fraud, because according to common law authorities, unlike fraud, gross
negligence can coexist with good faith and honesty of intention. 148 Thus,
proving the elements of gross negligence will be easier for a plaintiff than
those of fraud and perhaps the more successful route that they should take.
The United Nations and UNPROFOR committed gross negligence when
they established the safe havens and disarmed the people of Srebrenica. Once
the U.N. established the safe havens it admittedly realized that the Serb forces
were not honoring this establishment and proceeded to march towards
Srebrenica, burning towns, raping women, and killing children along the way.
The U.N. was careless again when it deployed fewer than 2000 additional
troops instead of the requested 135,000. Furthermore, the U.N. had no plan or
strategy for UNPRFOR in case the Serbs attacked, which was not a question of
“if” but rather “when.” The U.N. carelessly disregarded the safety and lives of
the people of Srebrenica by disarming them and then failing to implement
reasonable measures that would protect these people. Thus, The Mothers of
Srebrenica have a valid claim that the U.N. committed gross negligence when
it established the safe havens and disarmed the people of Srebrenica.
3. Breach of Duty
The third cause of the action that The Mothers of Srebrenica have against
the United Nations and the Dutch government, is under the breach of duty
theory. Before a plaintiff can sue for breach of duty, he or she first must
establish that the defendant in fact owed the plaintiff a duty.149 First this Part
will establish that the United Nations and Dutch UNPROFOR troops
established a duty to protect the people of Srebrenica by disarming them and
promising them their protection. Next, this Part will establish a cause of action
for The Mothers of Srebrenica against the United Nations and UNPROFOR for
the breach of their duty to protect, which resulted in genocide.
In 1999, U.N. Secretary-General instructed forces under U.N. command
and control to respect international humanitarian law.150 This official statement
147

Id.
Id.
149 Id.
150 See Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq7l.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
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served as the basis for the discussion of whether international organizations
have a duty to protect, and specifically in the context of this Comment, the
duty to protect the safe havens that they create.151 Those who argue that no
such duty exists base their conclusion on the notion that “duties to protect
would have to originate out of art. 1 of the Geneva Convention IV and
Additional Protocol, which requires that contracting, parties ‘undertake to
respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all circumstances.’”152
This argument fails because those who are in support of it do not consider
other sources that can invoke the duty to protect.153 For example, as a result of
the atrocities that were committed in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United Nations
adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).154 The Responsibility to Protect
doctrine states:
The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations
from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its
populations, the international community must be prepared to take
collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.155

Also, in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty stated, “all states, but especially democracies, have a
responsibility to protect civilians when the civilians are threated with a mass
killing.”156 With this statement in 2001 and the adoption of R2P in 2005, the
United Nations clearly established that it has a duty in the international
community to protect those who need its protection the most. While these
doctrines are enacted after the Srebrenica genocide, the principles they carry
should be applied retroactively.
Even under the basic principles of tort law, the plaintiffs can successfully
argue that the United Nations owed them a duty to protect. Under basic tort
151 Sarah Perkins, The Failure to Protect: Expanding the Scope of Command Responsibility to the United
Nations at Srebrenica, 62 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 193, 195 (2004).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Mark Notaras & Vesselin Popovski, The Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://unu.edu/publications/articles/responsibility-to-protect-and-the-protection-of-civilians.
html (emphasis added).
155 The Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
156 Michael Ignatieff, The Duty to Protect, Still Urgent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013) http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/09/14/opinion/the-duty-to-protect-still-urgent.html?_r=0.
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law, a defendant can create a duty for himself, even in situation where a duty
did not exist, if he makes a promise, the plaintiff relies on that promise, and as
a result the plaintiff suffers a personal injury.157 In the case of Srebrenica, the
United Nations promised the people of Srebrenica safety through the concept
of this safe haven.158 The people of Srebrenica trusted the United Nations and
welcomed this proposal with open arms.159 In fact, the people of Srebrenica
relied on the United Nations’ promise to the extent that they were willing to
surrender any and all of their weapons and entrusted their lives to the United
Nations.160 In order to properly remedy this breach of duty, the Dutch Supreme
Court should acknowledge the United Nations and the Dutchbat’s breach of
duty and provide monetary compensation for The Mothers of Srebrenica’s
continued suffering.161
The safe haven of Srebrenica was supposed to be protected by the Dutch
UNPROFOR battalion. 162 These were Dutch soldiers who were serving the
United Nations on behalf of their country, the Netherlands.163 The basic theory
of agent and principle would apply in this instance, and history has long
established that military personnel are agents of the country on whose behalf
they are serving the mission.164 Thus, these soldiers served in UNPROFOR
because their country, the Netherlands, asked them to serve on this mission.
Only naturally then does the question arise: whether the Netherlands had a
duty to protect the people of Srebrenica through its Soldiers, and whether this
duty was breached when its soldiers failed on their mission?165
4. Right to Self-Defense
The last, but most certainly not the weakest, cause of action that The
Mothers have against the Netherlands and the United Nations is that they were
deprived of their inherent right to self-defense. 166 According to the United
Nations Article 51 there is an inherent right—either individually or
157

See generally Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501

(2006).
158

See generally U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35.
See id.
160 Id. ¶ 59–60, 62.
161 See generally id.
162 Id. ¶ 104.
163 See generally id.
164 See generally Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 203 (2005).
165 Id.
166 See United Nations Charter, art. 51.
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collectively—to self-defense if an armed attack occurs. 167 UNPROFOR
deprived the people of Srebrenica of this right when it disarmed them in
exchange for UNPROFOR’s protection. 168 Even though the United Nations
acknowledged that Srebrenica was a “massacre waiting to happen” it deprived
the people of Srebrenica the right to protect themselves by disarming them and
inducing them to rely on a protection force that was incapable of any
protection.169 The least that UNPROFOR could have done to not violate the
right to self-defense is returned to the people of Srebrenica their weapons once
it realized that it would not be able to protect them.170
The people of Srebrenica have filed numerous suits against the United
Nations, as well as against the Netherlands.171 Many of these lawsuits have
been class actions by the plaintiffs known as “Stichting Mothers of
Srebrenica.” 172 Set up as a foundation under Netherlands law, this group is
composed primarily of women whose sons, husbands, fathers, brothers, and
other male relatives were murdered in the genocide.173 Unfortunately, none of
their lawsuits have been successful.174 The suits against the Netherlands were
protected on the basis that the United Nations had effective control over the
Dutchbat at the time of the genocide,175 thus the Netherlands was held not to be
responsible. In the meantime the suits against the United Nations also failed
because of the United Nations’ immunity defense, which under the umbrella
theory, which has been extended to protect U.N.’s peacekeeping missions,
such as UNPROFOR.176 However, this precedent is about to change as a result
of the Dutch Supreme Court’s recent 2013 ruling in The Netherlands v.
Nuhanović.177

167

Id.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 490; Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 maart 2010, LJN 2010 (Stichting
Mothers of Srebrenica/De Staat der Nederlanden en De Verenige Naties) (Neth.).
169 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 59.
170 See generally id.
171 See generally Manuel J. Ventura, Mothers of Srebrenica: The Obligation to Prevent Genocide and Jus
Cogens—Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
ignoring-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-the-obligation-to-prevent-genocide-jus-cogens/.
172 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland Application No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
3 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
173 See id.
174 See Ventura, supra note 174.
175 See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland Application No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R.
1, 6 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
176 See id. at paras. 141, 149, 169.
177 HR 6 januari 2013, RvdW 2013, 1037 m.nt. (De Staat der Nederlanden/Nuhanović) (Neth.) para. 33–
36.
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E. The Nuhanović Case As Precedent For The Mothers of Srebrenica
In Nuhanović, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld an earlier decision by the
court of appeals in 2011, which ruled that the Dutch state was liable for three
deaths committed during the genocide in Srebrenica.178 Hasan Nuhanović was
a United Nations interpreter for the Dutch peacekeepers and has been suing the
Dutch state for the last eleven years for the murder of his mother, father, and
brother in Srebrenica.179 While Mr. Nuhanović himself was considered “local
personnel” of the United Nations, his mother, Nasiha Nuhanvoic, brother,
Muhamed Nuhanvoic, and father, Ibro Nuhanovic, as well as an electrician
who worked at the compound, Rizo Mustafic, sought refuge on the Dutch
station base in Srebrenica after the enclave fell into the hands of the Serbs.180
The Dutch, who had already witnessed the Serbs beating and killing male
refugees outside of their compound, threw these three men out, along with
another 200 refuge seeking men, and handed them over to the Serbs.181 To no
one’s surprise, the Serbian forces executed all of these refuge-seeking
civilians.182 The Dutch Supreme Court held that the Dutch government was
responsible for the deaths of those refugees the Dutch forced to leave the
compound.183
To fully understand the implications that the Nuhanović case will have on
The Mothers, it is important to understand the consequences the genocide of
Srebrenica has had on United Nations and the Netherlands.
Three years after the genocide, on November 30, 1998, the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution A/RES/53/35 that
requested the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive report, assessing
the events that occurred in Srebrenica from the date that the safe havens were
178 Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths–court, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (Sept. 6, 2013, 11:37 ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23986063 [hereinafter BRIT. BROAD. CORP.].
179 Id.
180 HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.); for a
discussion of the electrician see BRIT. BROAD. CORP., supra note 176.
181 See BRIT. BROAD. CORP., supra note 181; Dan Bilefsky & Marlise Simons, Netherlands Held Liable
for 300 Deaths in Srebrenica Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/
world/europe/court-finds-netherlands-responsible-for-srebrenica-deaths.html?_r=0.
182 See id.; see also Kieran Corcoran, Dutch peacekeepers were responsible for 300 Bosnian Muslims at
Srebrenica who sought refuge at UN base in 1995, Dutch Court Rules, DAILY MAIL (July 16, 2014, 13:49 ET),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2694427/Dutch-peacekeepers-responsible-death-300-BosnianMuslims-Srebrenica-sought-refuge-UN-base-1995-Dutch-court-rules.html.
183 Michael Ignatieff, The Duty to Protect, Still Urgent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/09/14/opinion/the-duty-to-protect-still-urgent.html?_r=0; Dutch State liable over 300 Srebrenica
Deaths, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (July 16, 2014, 11:49 ET), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28313285.
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created—April 16, 1993—until the endorsement of the cease fire, the Dayton
Peace Agreement, by the Security Council on December 15, 1995.184 Three
years later, on November 15, 1999, the 113 page long, final report was
distributed to the General Assembly.185 While the report summarized various
“peace-making efforts” and “decision-making procedures in the United
Nations Security Council, UNPF, and UNPROFOR,” the most pertinent aspect
of the report is Section XI: “The fall of Srebrenica: an assessment.”186 The
following excerpt from the report established that UN had a duty to protect the
people of Srebrenica, and violated the people of Srebrenica’s right, under the
Charter of the United Nations, to self-defense, by stating:
The community of nations decided to respond to the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina with an arms embargo, with humanitarian aid and
with the deployment of a peacekeeping force. It must be clearly
stated that these measures were poor substitutes for more decisive
and forceful action to prevent the unfolding horror. The arms
embargo did little more than freeze in place the military balance
within the former Yugoslavia. It left the Serbs in a position of
overwhelming military dominance and effectively deprived the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of its right, under the Charter of
the United Nations, to self-defense. It was not necessarily a mistake
to impose an arms embargo, which after all had been done when
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not yet a State Member of the United
Nations. Once that was done, however, there must surely have been
some attendant duty to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina, after it
became a Member State, from the tragedy that then befell it. Even as
the Serbs attacks on and strangulation of the ‘safe areas’ continued in
1993 and 1994, all widely covered by the media and, presumably, by
diplomatic and intelligence reports to their respective Governments,
the approach of the members of the Security Council remained
largely constant. The international community still could not find the
political will to confront the menace defying it.187

Thus, the Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica have two causes of action against
the United Nations: failure to protect and violation of self-defense.188 Before
addressing the United Nations’ immunity, and how it has so far rendered these

184

Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland Application No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
6–7 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
185 Id. at 7.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See id.
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lawsuits unsuccessful, it is useful to also establish the causes of action that The
Mothers have against the Netherlands.
One of the reasons that the Nuhanović case is ground breaking for The
Mothers, and possibly future victims of genocide, is that the Dutch Supreme
Court affirmed Mr. Nuhanovic’s breach of duty to protect claim against the
Dutch government. 189 The two main issues in the Nuhanovic case that the
Court answered were whether Dutchbat’s conduct could be attributed to the
State,190 and whether Dutchbat’s conduct was wrongful.191 As in every case, it
is important to understand the underlying facts of the Dutchbat’s involvement
in the genocide before the above questions can properly be assessed and
answered.
After General Mladić captured Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, “a stream of
refugees” fled the town and sought shelter in the Dutchbat compound, which
initially allowed more than 5000 of the refugees to enter the compound,
including 239 men of military age (i.e. men between the ages of 16 and 60).192
On that same evening, Dutch Defense Minister Voorhoeve agreed to evacuate
the refugees in a telephone conference with General Nicolai, Chief of Staff of
UNPROFOR HQ, and shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Colonel Karremans
received a fax message from General Gobillard, Deputy Commander of
UNPROFOR HQ, “instructing him to enter into negotiations with the BosnianSerb army and to protect the refugees.” 193 A few hours later, Lieutenant
Karremans followed orders and met with Mladić. He requested withdrawal of
the Dutch battalion and to arrange for the safe withdrawal of the refugees.194
The next day, on July 12, 1995, Voorhoeve instructed Karremans to “save
whatever can be saved” from the Serbs and evacuate from Srebrenica.195 For
the last time, Karremans met with Mladić to set up an evacuation plan, which
was negotiated for only the Dutchbat and twenty-nine “local personnel”196 and
by early afternoon the remaining of the refugees outside the Dutchbat
compound were taken away by the Serbs.197 By the next day, the Dutchbat
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 7.
Id. at 7–8.
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troops received reports of the Serbs committing crimes against the refugees
they had taken from the compound the day before—in particular crimes against
the male refugees. 198 The male refugees were taken some 300-400 meters
outside the UNPROFOR compound, where they were then beaten, stripped of
their identity papers and then executed. 199 The Serbs murdered the great
majority of all the men of military age who were left in Srebrenica.200
Since Nuhanovic was an interpreter for UNPROFOR, he was considered
one of the twenty-nine local personnel and was placed on the evacuation list.201
After the fall of Srebrenica, his father, mother, and minor brother sought refuge
in the compound, but were not placed on the evacuation list since they were
not “employees of the U.N.” 202 Nuhanović, aware of the gravity of the
situation outside of the compound, made several unsuccessful attempts to add
his family to the evacuation list in an attempt to try and save their lives.203
After learning that they were not allowed to stay at the UNPROFOR
compound, Nuhanović’s father, mother, and brother made their way towards
the exist of the compound, when Major Franken had a change of heart and
offered to allow Ibro, the father, to stay at the compound since he had been a
member of the civilian committee that had held the consultations with
Mladić.204 Since Nuhanović’s mother and brother were not offered that same
opportunity, Ibro chose to leave the compound together with his wife and his
son, which resulted in all three of them being murdered by the Serbs.205 After
most of the genocide was committed, the Dutchbat left their compound on July
21, 1995.206
Nuhanvoić’s claim for damages from the Dutch government is based on
two causes of action: the Dutchbat wrongly refused to add his brother to the
list of local personnel; and the wrongful conduct by the Dutchbat of expelling
his father, mother, and brother from the compound.207 The first issue that the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands addressed was whether the Netherlands
could be held responsible for the actions of the Dutchbat, or whether these acts
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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were solely attributable to the United Nations. 208 The Court held that the
standard for determining whether the Dutchbat’s conduct should be attributed
to the United Nations or to the State, depends on the effective control theory
which asks: “which of them had effective control over the Dutchbat at the time
of the conduct referred to in these proceedings.”209 The Court also established
that “effective control” includes not only giving orders, but also having the
capacity to prevent wrongdoings.210 While the court pointed to the generally
accepted “effective control” theory which states “that where a State has placed
troops at the disposal of the United Nations to carry out a peace mission, the
answer to the question as to which of them specific conduct of such troops
must be attributed depends on which of them had effective control over the
conduct in question,”211 the Court also noted that more than one party can have
effective control simultaneously. 212 Since Nuhanović did not argue that the
United Nations had effective control over the Dutchbat, the Supreme Court
decided to leave that issue open, but the Court established that the Netherlands
did in fact have “effective control” over the Dutchbat, thus making the State
liable for any of the Dutchbat’s illegal actions.213
In Nuhanović the Court attributed to the Netherlands the unlawful conduct
of the Dutchbat because the Dutchbat should not have asked Muhamed to
leave the compound since it knew the risks to which Muhamed would be
exposed. 214 The Court based its holding on the fact that the State acted
wrongfully towards the victims under domestic law of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as under treaty law by violating Ibro, Muhamed, and
Nasiha’s right to life and prohibition of inhuman treatment.215 Nuhanović was
able to recover damages for his family’s loss, as well as for the damages that
he suffered and continues to suffer on account of his family’s loss.216

208

Id. at 4.
Id. at 11.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 11–12.
212 Id. at 12.
213 Id. at 11–12.
214 Id. at 12. The “open door” means the analysis of whether the United Nations had effective control over
the Dutchbat.
215 Id. at 13.
216 Id.
209
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F. New Implications for Other Victims of Genocide in Light of the Nuhanović
Case
The face of The Mothers is Munira Subasic, a woman who lost twenty-two
family members in the Srebenica genocide, and is now seeking to promote
awareness, justice, and an opportunity for all the of those who have lost
someone they loved to heal.217 Ms. Subasic has testified at the ICTY against
many Serbs who were accused of committing genocide in Srebrenica. 218
Unfortunately, most legal actions brought by The Mothers against the United
Nations and the Netherlands—at least up until this point—have been
unsuccessful, mainly because the Netherlands continue to claim that it did not
have “effective control” over the Dutchbat, while the United Nations has been
deemed to have immunity from the claims.219 As a result of the Nuhanović
decision, however, The Mothers could potentially use this precedent to receive
damages for those they lost as a result of wrongful and negligent conduct on
behalf of the United Nations and the Netherlands.220
The Mothers’ legal battle with the United Nations and the Netherlands
started in 2005; however, due to recent developments it is important to analyze
the cases against the two parties separately. While the Nuhanović decision
might aid The Mothers in their lawsuit against the Netherlands, it might be too
late to make a difference in their suits against the United Nations because its
immunity protected it in the prior lawsuits, and the Dutch Supreme Court did
not—and could not—invalidate the United Nations’ immunity defense.221 In
their initial lawsuit, The Mothers joined the Netherlands and the United
Nations as codefendants, basing their claims on international and Dutch civil
law.222 Their Dutch civil law claims were based on the following: the United
Nations and the Netherlands failed to abide by the agreement which had been
executed with the inhabitants of the Srebrenica enclave (including the
217 See Svjetski mediji o izbacivanju Munire Subašić sa sjednice u UN-u [World media coverage on the
expulsion of Muria Subasic from the U.N.], KLIX (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/svjetskimediji-o-izbacivanju-munire-subasic-sa-sjednice-u-un-u/130411110.
218 Id.
219 See Srebrenica Massacre Survivors Take Legal Action Against Dutch Government, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 7, 2014 9:20 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/07/srebrenica-massacre-bosnia-andherzegovina.
220 See Tom Dannenbaum, Dutch Supreme Court Affirms That Dutchbat Acted Unlawfully in Srebrenica,
EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/dutch-supreme-court-affirms-that-dutchbat-actedunlawfully-in-srebrenica/ [hereinafter Dutch Supreme Court Affirms].
221 See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, EUR. CT. H.R.
1, 15–16 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
222 Id. at 14.
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applicants) by which the above-mentioned parties committed to provide
protection inside the Srebrenica safe area in exchange for disarmament; and the
Netherlands, with the connivance of the United Nations committed a tort
against the applicants since they failed to send well-equipped troops to Bosnia
that would have been capable of ensuring a stable and peaceful environment
for the entire zone.223
As anticipated by the Plaintiffs, the United Nations relied on its privileges
and immunities granted to it under the U.N. Charter in order for the
organization to be able to effectively and independently carry out its
functions.224 According to Article 105, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter: “The
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members [Member
States] such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of
its purpose.”225 Additionally, the United Nations pointed to Article II, Section
2 of the Immunities Convention that grants the United Nations immunity as
follows, “The United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity.” 226 In The Mothers case, the United Nations failed to waive its
immunities, and in fact did not even appear to defend this lawsuit, allowing the
State of the Netherlands to represent it on it this matter.227
The Mothers challenged the Dutch National Court’s grant of the U.N.
immunities in their newly lawsuit filed in 2013 with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR). 228 On June 27, 2013, the Court held that the
Netherlands did not violate the applicants’ right to “access to a court,” as
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, by granting the United Nations
immunity from domestic jurisdiction. 229 The Court, however, neglected to
answer the lingering question of what it would take for an international
organization to be legally accountable for its conduct.230 When the Court was
weighing the right of The Mothers to access the courts against the privilege
and immunities of international organizations, the Court stated, “International
223
224
225
226
227

2–5.

Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, LJN: BR0133 The Hague Court of Appeal (July 5, 2011).
Id.
U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1.
Id.; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 2, sec. 2 (Feb. 13, 1946).
Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, LJN: BR0133 The Hague Court of Appeal (July 5, 2011),

228 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, EUR. CT. H.R. 1,
14 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255.
229 Id. at 24.
230 See generally id.
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law does not support the position that a civil claim should override immunity
from suit for the sole reason that it is based on an allegation of a particularly
grave violation of a norm of international law, even a norm of ius cogens.”231
Ironically, in this decision the European Court of Human Rights considered
immunity to be of greater value and importance than gruesome violations of
human rights, such as genocide.
While it appears that The Mothers have reached the end of their road in
their lawsuits against the United Nations, a strong policy argument exists that
the United Nations should waive its privileges and immunities and allow the
courts to determine liability as a result of the Nuhanović decision.232 Instead,
they are seeking these damages for their suffering and loss of companionship,
and in an effort to promote awareness, responsibility, and prevent such future
failures from occurring elsewhere.233 The United Nations, an organization that
was created in the aftermath of the Holocaust and whose primary mission is to
promote and ensure human rights, ought to give more consideration to the
access of courts for gross human rights violations. As stated August Reinisch
and Ulf Andreas Aeber, “human rights rationale of providing access to court is
equally cogent in the context of the immunity of international
organizations.” 234 This is a very valid point, especially because the United
Nations itself accepted responsibility:
The international community as a whole must accept its share of
responsibility for allowing this tragic course of events by its
prolonged refusal to use force in the early stages of the war. This
responsibility is shared by the Security Council, the Contact Group,
and the other Governments which contributed to the delay in the use
of force, as well as by the United Nations Secretariat and the mission
in the field.235
231

Id. at 41.
See Tom Dannenbaum, Dutch Supreme Court Affirms That Dutchbat Acted Unlawfully in Srebrenica,
EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/dutch-supreme-court-affirms-that-dutchbat-actedunlawfully-in-srebrenica/; see also Manuel J. Ventura, Mothers of Srebrenica: The Obligation to Prevent
Genocide and Jus Cogens—Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 6, 2013), http://
www.ejiltalk.org/ignoring-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-the-obligation-to-preventgenocide-jus-cogens/.
233 Id.
234 August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas Weber, The Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations,
The Individual’s Rights of Access to the Courts and Administrative Tribunals as Alternative Means of Dispute
Settlement, 1 INT’L. ORG. L. REV. 59, 67 (2004).
235 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, EUR. CT. H.R. 1,
7 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255 (quoting U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of
232
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It is very counterintuitive that the United Nations takes responsibility for
Srebrenica in investigative reports, yet denies The Mothers a day in court
based on its immunity. 236 The General Assembly should address this
inconsistency in the immediate future, and pass a resolution that would waive
the United Nations’ immunity in the proceedings initiated by The Mothers,
allowing the trier of fact to determine liability, and if appropriate, damages.
Unless and until the United Nations Generally Assembly passes a
resolution waiving the United Nations’ immunity in the Srebrenica
proceedings, The Mothers will not be successful in obtaining any damages for
the loss of their loved ones from the United Nations.237
However, the Dutch Courts have opened the door for other victims to bring
suit against culpable States. 238 As the Nuhanović decision makes clear, the
Netherlands does not enjoy the same protection under the Charter of the United
Nations, and the privileges and immunities that the Charter does grant are for
the United Nations exclusively, not member States. 239 Nevertheless, States
involved in the peacekeeping operations still assert the United Nations’
privileges and immunities, arguing that they are shielded from liability. 240
However, there is indication that the United Nations’ immunity does not shield
States liability, for example, the Internationally Wrongful Act of an
International Organization, Chapter II, Article 7 “Attribution of conduct to an
international organization and State,” reads as follows:
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another
international organization shall be considered under international law

Srebrenica, ¶ 501, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999)); HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt.
LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 17–20.
236 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, EUR. CT. H.R. 1,
31 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122255; The Nuhanović Case, supra
note 200.
237 See generally Manuel J. Ventura, Mothers of Srebrenica: The Obligation to Prevent Genocide and Jus
Cogens—Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
ignoring-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-the-obligation-to-prevent-genocide-jus-cogens/.
238 See generally HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic)
(Neth.); see also Owen Bowcott, Netherlands to pay compensation over Srebrenica massacre, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/06/netherlands-compensation-srebrenicamassacre.
239 See generally HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic)
(Neth.); see also U.N. Charter art. 100 para. 2.
240 Scott P. Sheeran, Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping and International Law, IDCR (2011).
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an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective
control over that conduct.241

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands dismissed this as a restriction on the
Netherlands’ responsibility for Srebrenica. 242 However, most recently in the
Nuhanović decision, the Court clearly stated that conduct of peacekeeping
missions could be attributed to the international organization and the State.243
While the United Nations exercised effective control over the Dutchbat due
to the command control it had over the troops, the disciplinary powers and
criminal jurisdiction (the “organic commands”) remained vested in the
Netherlands.244 Accordingly, the principle of command responsibility is also
appropriate in this context, since it was the Netherlands commanders on the
ground in Srebrenica.245 Command responsibility is a form of responsibility
that arises from an omission to act. 246 In such instances, the
commander/superior may be held criminally responsible under this doctrine
where, during his awareness of the crimes of subordinates, he culpably fails to
fulfill his duties to prevent and punish these crimes. 247 While this doctrine
requires that the commander’s subordinates commit the crimes before he can
be held responsible, the purpose of this doctrine supports that a literal meaning
of “subordinates” should not be required.248 “Command responsibility evolved
out of an ethic that abhorred the notion that an individual, with the power to
stop the commission of a crime and the professional duty to enforce and ensure
respect for order, could simply stand by and allow such crimes to take
place.”249 This doctrine has been created to serve greater justice, and the intent
of the document should be taken into consideration when attempting to hold
commanders responsible even for crimes not committed by their
subordinates.250 The requirement that the subordinates commit the crime is not

241 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 63rd Sess.,
Apr. 26–June 3 and July 4–Aug. 12 2011, ¶¶ 87–88, U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2011) (emphasis added).
242 HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 35.
243 Id. at 19.
244 Id.; Sheeran, supra note 243.
245 Guenal Mettraux, The Doctrine of Superior/Command Responsibility, PEACE AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/command-responsibility.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Perkins, supra note 169, at 196.
250 See id.
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the purpose of this doctrine, rather, justice is.251 Those who are commanders
and subordinates should not allow genocide to be committed on those who
they swore to protect. While holding the commanders criminally responsible is
perhaps stretching the document beyond its intent, it would be appropriate to
hold the commanders responsible for their omission to act and protect the
people of Srebrenica.252
G. What’s Next for The Mothers?
As a result of the recent holding in Nuhanović, The Mothers might be more
successful in litigation against the Netherlands. Since the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands attributed the Dutchbat’s wrongful conduct against Nuhanović’s
family, it ought to attribute the Dutchbat’s wrongful conduct against the rest of
the Srebrenica population to the Netherlands. 253 The goal of The Mothers’
litigation is to raise awareness and prevent future genocide. However, they
should argue that they were denied the right to self-defense due to
UNPRFOR’s breach of duty to protect them and the United Nations’ negligent
establishment of the save haven.254 While the Court in Nuhanović distinguished
the other victims from those of the Nuhanović family, The Mothers should
have argued that everyone in Srebrenica was in the same situation as the
Nuhanović family, and that UNPROFOR owed them the same duties.255 Under
international law, the victims outside the compound have an equal right to life
and protection, as did Nuhanovic’s family.256 The ICJ has also indicated that
there is a global responsibility to prevent genocide, varying with a state’s
“capacity to influence” the genocidal action.257 This capacity to influence is
determined by looking at several factors, one of which being “geographical
distance” of the state who has a duty to protect and the wrongdoings which are
to be committed. 258 It is undoubted that the Dutchbat had the influence to

251

See id.
See id.
253 See HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 31.
254 Mothers v. Netherlands, supra note 85; See also Manuel J. Ventura, Mothers of Srebrenica: The
Obligation to Prevent Genocide and Jus Cogens—Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK!
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ignoring-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-theobligation-to-prevent-genocide-jus-cogens/.
255 See HR 6 september 2013, RvdW 2008, 12/03324 m.nt. LZ/TT (Netherlands/Nuhanovic) (Neth.) 31.
256 See id.
257 See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montengro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 221 (Feb. 26).
258 Id.
252
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prevent genocide, as evidenced by the several meetings that the Dutch
commanders had with Mladić as Srebrenica fell.259
H. Implications for Future Peacekeeping Missions
One of the most dangerous conflicts ongoing in the world today is the crisis
in Syria. Resembling many events that occurred in the early 1990’s in Bosnia,
the conflict in Syria is developing on the world platform due to technological
advances.260 More blood is shed and more innocent lives are lost, all while the
rest of the world is deliberating on the proper course of action. As with any
military intervention, the Security Council has met and deliberated the
possibility of a United Nations intervention in Syria.261 The Russians, a close
ally of the Syrian government, opposed the intervention, blocking the draft
resolution in front of the Security Council.262 Shortly thereafter, the Obama
administration proposed American intervention based on humanitarian efforts
to end the bloodshed and restore peace in Syria. 263 The American people
resisted his proposition mainly because of their negative experience with
recent U.S. involvement in the Middle East, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, there is another concern that was not properly addressed by
Congress: once it got involved in the conflict, the United States would take on
the responsibility of protecting the people of Syria. If, after taking on this
responsibility, the United States failed in its mission, it could be held
accountable under the Dutch Supreme Court rationale.
The possibility of accountability should not discourage States to get
involved in peacekeeping missions. However, when States or the United
Nations make the decision to get involved in an armed conflict and protect
human rights, they should make that decision calculatedly. For example, a
peacekeeping mission is not viable in places that do not have peace; instead a
cease-fire is required first. However, once a decision is made to get involved
259 Compare Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. Netherland App. No. 65542/12, Eur. Ct. H.R.
1, 13 (2013), with Manuel J. Ventura, Mothers of Srebrenica: The Obligation to Prevent Genocide and Jus
Cogens—Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: Talk! (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
ignoring-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-the-obligation-to-prevent-genocide-jus-cogens/.
260 Conor Higgins, The Dangers in Limited Involvement in Syria, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Sept. 20,
2013),
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/its-all-smoke-and-whiskey/2013/sep/20/
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and save lives, if the people have to give up something in exchange for
international protection, they should have a remedy if that protection fails.
Based on the Nuhanović decision, however, foreign involvement in other
countries for peace restoration might nevertheless be affected. 264 If The
Mothers case against the Netherlands proves to be successful, no state should
hinder humanitarian efforts in the fear of getting sued for permitting genocide,
because after all, the involvement should prevent genocide and human rights
violations.265
While accountability for States and organizations that fail their mission
should exist, the scope should not be too broad. The instance where plaintiffs
should have the strongest cause of action against a State or the United Nations
that aided them in unsuccessful peacekeeping missions is if the plaintiffs had
to give up something in exchange for the protection of the international
community. For example, the people of Srebrenica laid down their arms in
exchange for the protection from UNPROFOR. However, if the plaintiffs were
not required to give up anything for the protection of the international
community during a peacekeeping mission, their claim, while still possibly
valid, ought to be scrutinized more. Perhaps the strongest argument those
plaintiffs would have is that they were induced into believing that the
international community would protect them, but that is not the same as trading
their own weapons in reliance on the protection from the international
community.
The Nuhanović case, and potentially the case of The Mothers against the
Netherlands, might hold States and International Organizations accountable for
their failed peacekeeping missions. This accountability might in fact be a
successful shift in international law, ensuring more successful peacekeeping
missions and achieving the goal of preserving human rights. In context, it
always important to remember that the purpose of these missions is to preserve
human rights—and that a right does not exist if there is no remedy for it once
that right is violated.
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